

25 Years Berlin Republic

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25 YEARS BERLIN REPUBLIC

REFLECTIONS ON / OF GERMAN UNIFICATION

(1990-2015)

Wilhelm Fink

Gedruckt mit freundlicher Unterstützung des Charles Phelps Taft Research Center at the University of Cincinnati

Umschlagabbildung:
Kristin Annen/Shutterstock.com

Bibliografische Information der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek

Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über <http://dnb.d-nb.de> abrufbar.

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(Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, Niederlande; Brill USA Inc., Boston MA, USA; Brill Asia Pte Ltd, Singapore; Brill Deutschland GmbH, Paderborn, Deutschland)

Internet: www.fink.de

Einbandgestaltung: Evelyn Ziegler, München
Herstellung: Brill Deutschland GmbH, Paderborn

ISBN 978-3-7705-6193-3 (paperback)

ISBN 978-3-8467-6193-9 (e-book)

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Introduction

Sind wir ein Volk?

In the run-up to the commemoration of the 25th anniversary of German Unification, the office of *Die Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für die neuen Bundesländer* published a study titled *Deutschland 2014 – 25 Jahre Friedliche Revolution und deutsche Einheit*. Based on two thousand interviews conducted by the *Zentrum für Sozialforschung* at the University of Halle-Wittenberg during 2014, the report offered a highly differentiated statistical response to the question, yielding the following assessment:

Am stärksten fühlen sich Bürger Ostdeutschlands im Jahr 2014 mit ihrem Wohnort verbunden, gefolgt vom Bundesland, Ostdeutschland, Gesamtdeutschland und Europa. [...] Im Westen des Landes zeigt sich ein etwas anderes Bild. Primärer gefühlsmäßiger Bezugsrahmen ist hier nicht der Wohnort, sondern das Bundesland; es folgen der Wohnort, Deutschland, Westdeutschland, Europa und [...] an letzter Stelle Ostdeutschland.¹

At the time of its publication in February 2015, the study was highlighted in print and other media venues throughout Germany. The study's provocative question ("Sind wir ein Volk?") was not simply rhetorical. This question has been posed time and again in public forums since the *Wende*, becoming especially prevalent at anniversaries of the Fall of the Wall and Unification. This volume contains reflections on the Berlin Republic at the end of its first quarter century, posing different questions and addressing different areas of culture, but always circling around that central question of German identity in the 21st century: "Sind wir ein Volk?"

Of course, the relevance of the debates about Germany's identity have been widely addressed not only in popular forums, but also in academic venues that have considered the state of German unification since the Fall of the Wall. Todd Herzog's and Sander Gilman's co-edited volume *A New Germany in a New Europe*² (2001) looked back from the perspective of ten years of German

1 Everhard Holtmann, et al. *Deutschland 2014. 25 Jahre Friedliche Revolution und Deutsche Einheit – Ergebnisse eines Forschungsprojekts*, Zentrum für Sozialforschung an der Martin-Luther-Universität Halle-Wittenberg, February 2015, pp. 225-226.

2 Todd Herzog and Sander L. Gilman, ed. *A New Germany in a New Europe*, New York and London 2001.

unification and asked six questions about the ongoing project by pairing German-based experts with US-based experts on the topics. Two years later Winand Gellner and John D. Robertson edited a volume on *The Berlin Republic: German Unification and a Decade of Changes*.³ There was another flurry of commemorations and considerations following the twentieth anniversary of the Fall of the Wall. The year 2011 alone saw Katharina Gerstenberger's and Jana Braziel's co-edited volume *After the Berlin Wall: Germany and Beyond*,⁴ Michael Gehler's *Three Germanies: West Germany, East Germany and the Berlin Republic*⁵ and David Clarke's and Ute Wölfel's *Remembering the German Democratic Republic: Divided Memory in a United Germany*.⁶ In 2015 Ben Gook published *Divided Subjects, Invisible Borders: Re-Unified Germany after 1989*⁷ and in 2017 Matt Cornish published *Performing Unification: History and Nation in German Theater after 1989*.⁸ The current volume, which takes the perspective from twenty-five years of unification, thus joins a long and expanding list of academic studies centering on the topic of the Berlin Republic and the issue of German Unification. Future historians will no doubt not only be interested in the history of the Berlin Republic itself, but also the history of reflections on the Berlin Republic, documenting the changing hopes, fears, and assessments along the way as the Republic negotiates its way through the 20th and 21st centuries and various anniversaries of Unification come and go. Whether implicitly or explicitly, the scholars in this volume reflect on the same essential questions that have at the center since those first assessments of the Berlin Republic: "Sind wir ein Volk?"

Institutional Culture

This volume is divided into three broad sections. The four chapters in the first section look at Institutional Cultures. The section opens with Timothy White's chapter tracking the shifts in German foreign policy across recent decades,

3 Winand Gellner and John D. Robertson, ed. *The Berlin Republic: German Unification and a Decade of Changes*, New York and London 2003.

4 Katharina Gerstenberger and Jana Braziel, ed. *After the Berlin Wall: Germany and Beyond*, London 2011.

5 Michael Gehler, *Three Germanies: West Germany, East Germany and the Berlin Republic*, London 2011.

6 David Clarke and Ute Wölfel, ed. *Remembering the German Democratic Republic: Divided Memory in a United Germany*, London 2011.

7 Ben Gook, *Divided Subjects, Invisible Borders: Re-Unified Germany after 1989*, London 2015.

8 Matt Cornish, *Performing Unification: History and Nation in German Theater after 1989*, Ann Arbor 2017.

arguing that German foreign policy has gone through a process towards post Cold War “normalization,” a condition reflecting the united nation’s self-confident integration into the European Union and the global community of nations. He tests his more theoretical theses by parsing the German opposition to the Iraq War of 2003 and views Germany’s rejection of U.S. policy in 2003 as evidence of an increasingly assertive German foreign policy that was not afraid to garner the vociferous disapprobation of U.S. policymakers. White then offers a second test case in his trenchant analysis of Germany’s response to Russian aggression in the Ukraine – an area that is especially fraught with historical implications for Germany. Finally, the unconditional support of a policy of austerity in Greece is shown to be one of German economic self-interest in both European and global contexts. While the challenges of the so-called refugee crisis and BREXIT postdate the scope of White’s study, these developments only serve to strengthen his thesis that Germany is following a path of what he terms “cosmopolitan internationalism.”

Hartmut von Sass contributes a thought-provoking essay on the relevance of ecclesiastical institutions during the *friedliche Revolution* of 1989. Rather than retell the well-known history of the gatherings in churches and *Montagsdemonstrationen* in Leipzig and elsewhere, von Sass opts instead for an emphasis on the concept and realities of secularization in which religious leaders opened their houses for groups that were at odds with the state, making, in his argument, the peaceful revolution of 1989 possible. His answer to the question he poses – How religious was the revolutionary movement in the GDR? – is nuanced and concludes that ‘secularization’ does not have to mean exclusively the decline of the religious, but rather also must consider the embeddedness of religion within a larger, pluralistic social setting. What matters is the possibility of having a reflective choice for or against religious commitment.

Dieter Fratzke, the long-time director of the Lessing Museum in Kamenz, Saxony, is in a unique position to trace the transition of an East German cultural institution from well before Unification to the 21st century. Back then, ideological strictures governed his work and, indeed, defined the museum’s exhibits in terms of the notion that Gotthold Ephraim Lessing was a *Vorkämpfer der bürgerlichen Revolution*. While he and his staff were able to carve out a less ideological representation of Lessing, practical issues – such as access to West German scholarship and other resources – necessarily affected their work. Fratzke negotiated the way through the political and cultural paradigm shift after Unification by harnessing opportunities within the cultural politics of the 1990’s to enable the Lessing Museum to emerge as a well-respected global presence co-equal with the *Lessingakademie* in Wolfenbüttel and the Lessing

Society in the United States. The process is well outlined in his paper, making it an especially valuable case study of institutional memory culture before and after the Berlin Republic.

Grounding her research in cultural memory studies, Pamela Hess presents the results of interviews with *Wendekinder* – people born between 1973 and 1984 to socially integrated parents who were born between 1953 and 1960. She finds that this generation, in contrast to their parents, do not feel compelled to defend the GDR. They have spent the bulk of their lives in a united Germany and take a more nuanced version of the society that they were born into. Hess thereby offers a differentiated view of Unification embedded in the institution of the family: Unification may have been achieved politically, her research suggests, but not on the most human level in terms of a shared memory across generations.

Media Culture

The second section turns its attention to Media Culture. Paul Michael Lützeler offers an extended overview of the socio-political developments culminating in the fall of the Berlin Wall, the necessary and useful preface to a fascinating and important linkage of Peter Schneider's *Der Mauerspringer* (1982) to the newspaper magnate and opponent of progressive causes, Axel Springer. While they would seem to have been strange bedfellows, Lützeler's provocative thesis is that both shared an obsession with the Wall. Tracing the Wall through Schneider's oeuvre, Lützeler shows that his constant goal has always been to tear down that wall that lies within our heads.

Richard Schade's contribution to the volume details how Günter Grass remained, in a time of almost universal euphoria for Unification, a vocal and insistent naysayer. He mounted a quixotic campaign to counter then Chancellor Helmut Kohl in the form of readings from his drama *Die Plebejer proben den Aufstand* (1965). His itinerary took him through the GDR from Prenzlauer Berg to Leipzig and Altdöbern, the dramatic readings from a play focusing on the Workers Revolt of 1953 reminding his listeners of the continuities of German history. That he was not heard, his call in the *Reichstag* for a *Bund deutscher Länder* ignored, suggests that engaged literary textuality was not the appropriate medium for effective political speech in times of accelerated socio-cultural change.

Confessing that he was once an East German intellectual himself (for about an hour), Walter Erhart offers a case study of his personal experience in the academy during the early years of the *Berliner Republik*. Recalling his time as

a West German academic teaching in post-Wall Greifswald, he asks humanist scholars to consider the ghost-like presence of scholars and theories that came to defeat in the 20th century.

Tanja Nusser's paper focuses on two films – Robert Thalheim's *Netto* (2005) and Christian Petzold's *Yella* (2007) – which she reads as reflections of the economic uncertainty of the neo-liberalist Berlin Republic. The characters in these films, like their real-life counterparts, are constantly attempting to find and employ a strategy that will allow them to cope in the new economy. The importance of these films is to highlight the stories of individual lives that are threatened in the Berlin Republic and identify a position from which an individual might be able to act.

Vanessa Plumly examines the case of Black Germans, who remain excluded from their national belonging by those white Germans who continue to deny them their national identity. Plumly discusses recent Black German productions and performances of *Heimat* in Berlin through close readings of texts by the Afro-German poets May Ayim and Chantal-Fleur Sanjon. The writers, she demonstrates, transgress the hegemonic notion of a singularly defined collective national *Heimat* imagined as white. Employing *Heimat* in their cultural texts via performative acts of transgressive decolonialization, Black Germans re-imagine the community as a plurality – *Heimat/en* – rather than as a mono-*Heimat* that is tied to the national landscape and by proxy the historically contrived *Blut und Boden* and *Lex sanguinis* ideology. Indeed, they employ their *Heimaten* to assert their very Germanness, so as to claim their place within the German national narrative, even while calling into question and interrupting its historical, teleological, and phenomenological arc. In this way, Black Germans transgress the boundaries of a white national *Heimat* landscape, perforce offering an alternate paradigm of Germanness in the *Berliner Republik*.

Memory Culture

The volume's final section is devoted to Memory Culture. Post-Wall Berlin is still very much defined by the Wall that has now been absent for a generation. Visitors (and residents) can and do walk the cobblestone traces of the Wall, visit the memorial on Bernauerstrasse, and view sweeps of it and segments scattered throughout the city, even if the structure has in truth (or at least in function) disappeared. Christine Leuenberger documents the cartographic record of pre-Unification Berlin and answers the question of how map-makers represent divisions by comparing it to another divided city, Jerusalem. She finds that East German maps of Berlin erase the West into a field of white

space, while West German maps tended to overemphasize the Wall and the East. As a point of comparison, she offers a fascinating comparison with Israeli maps of Jerusalem that emphasize Jewish spaces and erase the Palestinian topography of the city.

Kedron Barrett, an American artist living in Berlin from the early 1980s to the present, painted Berlin throughout his time there, even though, by his own admission, he found the Berlin Wall to be visually unimpressive. His paper reflects on the course of his career, seeing his paintings as manifestations of his changing state of mind vis-à-vis the Wall. He closes his contribution by comparing other examples of memorials, thereby contextualizing his own work within Berlin-based memorial culture.

Evan Torner argues that the German Democratic Republic continues to haunt the Berlin Republic. Taking up three rarely screened films from the early 1990s (*Letztes aus der DaDaer* (1990), *Der Strass* (1990), and *Das Land hinter dem Regenbogen* (1992)), he uses them to demonstrate the cultural energies released and repressed at the time of the *Wende*. In contrast to later films that would take a more “Ostalgic” look at the former GDR, he finds here a refusal to offer an easily digestible and coherent portrait of the former state. We are reminded that history is messy, confusing, and full of excesses that spill beyond neat borders.

The volume concludes with Joakim Glaser’s study of *Ostfußball* and its fan culture in the Berlin Republic. Tracing fan identification with clubs from the former GDR, he finds that they embed situated reactions to the dominant West German narratives about East Germany – before and after the *Wende*. Soccer becomes a space in which cultural references to the former GDR still exist and thus plays an important role in forming and negotiating identity in the Berlin Republic.

This volume is dedicated to Professor Richard E. Schade, who arrived at the University of Cincinnati in 1975, when the Berlin Wall was precisely halfway through its lifespan dividing the city in two. Educated at the University of New Hampshire (BA, 1966, MA, 1968) and Yale University (PhD, 1976), he remained at UC for the course of his long and productive career, before retiring in 2013 after nearly four decades of distinguished service. He was Head of the Department of Germanic Languages when the Wall fell and took a diplomatic post in the Berlin Republic a few years later, serving as Honorary Consul of the Federal Republic of Germany for Greater Cincinnati from 1996-2012. In 2007 he was awarded the *Bundesverdienstkreuz am Bande* for his service to Germany.

His early career was devoted to Early Modern and Enlightenment literature and visual culture, serving as longtime editor of the *Lessing Yearbook* (1978-2010) and authoring dozens of books and articles on a wide array of topics. Later in his career, he developed an interest in Günther Grass and has established himself as a leading authority on the Nobel Laureate's work. He received the A.B. Cohen Award for Excellence in Teaching, founded the UC Berlin Program, served on the Modern Language Association's Executive Committee, and was a Research Fellow at the C.P. Taft Research Center. He has taught at numerous institutions, including Yale University, the University of New Haven, and the University of Bielefeld, and returned to his alma mater every summer for several decades as Master Teacher at St. Paul's School in Concord, New Hampshire. He conceived and oversaw the conference from which the papers in this volume originated, held at the University of Cincinnati October 4-6, 2015 on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of German Unification. This conference and this volume are fitting capstones to a long and distinguished career by this important and cherished scholar, teacher, and community leader.

Institutional Culture

German Unification and Shifts in Foreign Policy

Much has been written about the end of the Cold War.¹ Recent scholarship has suggested that pragmatic and adaptable leadership proved crucial to unwinding the historically tense US-Soviet relationship and allowed German unification.² Other scholars have stressed the importance of domestic factors that drove leaders, especially Mikhail Gorbachev, to change policies and end the Cold War.³ Whatever the cause of the end of the Cold War, it fundamentally changed the nature of International Relations, especially in the European context. Since the end of World War II, the standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union had divided Europe and Germany. The economic and political developments that occurred during the Cold War were seen through the lens of this bipolar division. The end of the Cold War necessarily meant that the nature of European and German foreign policy would change.⁴ Germany was no longer the center of a bipolar conflict.⁵ The abrupt end of the Cold War and the rapid unification of Germany brought great change not just to Germany but to the world.⁶ A united Germany would have to construct its own role in this new post-Cold War world.⁷ Nevertheless, the historical legacy of Germany was extremely important when Germany first unified.⁸ This legacy might prevent a rapid emergence of an assertive and unilateral actor in world

1 I would like to thank Lorene Garnier for research and technical assistance with this chapter.

2 For the pragmatic nature of leaders in the midst of the great change that occurred at the end of the Cold War, see James Graham Wilson, *The Triumph of Improvisation: Gorbachev's Adaptability, Reagan's Engagement, and the End of the Cold War*, Ithaca 2014.

3 See Robert Snyder and Timothy J. White, »The Fall of the Berlin Wall: The Counterrevolution in Soviet Foreign Policy and the End of Communism«, in: Katharina Gerstenberger and Jana Evans (Eds.), *After the Berlin Wall: Germany and Beyond*, New York 2011, pp. 127-147.

4 Szabo claimed it was the end of one historical era and the beginning of another. See Stephen S. Szabo, *The Diplomacy of German Unification*, New York 1992, p. 2.

5 Many had argued that the question or status of Germany was at the heart of the Cold War. For example, see Marc Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963*, Princeton 1999.

6 Timothy Garton Ash, *In Europe's Name: Germany and the Divided Continent*, New York 1993, p. 343.

7 This world would be one where failing states may seek to build walls as the East Germans had tried to do, but the rise of non-state actors and forces makes the use of walls a failed effort to preserve a sense of sovereignty that no longer exists. See Wendy Brown, *Walled States, Waning Sovereignty*, New York 2010.

8 Peter H. Merkl, *German Unification in the European Context*, University Park, PA 1993, p. 22.

politics, but would the legacy fade as Germany sought to utilize its power to achieve its goals in world politics?⁹

German Unification and International Relations Theory

The unification of Germany after the Cold War not only has had profound security implications for Europe but sparked a debate among scholars of International Relations. Realists contended that the unification would inevitably lead to Germany's assertion of its status as the most powerful state in central Europe.¹⁰ Given the increased power of Germany based on a larger population and the demise of the Soviet Union as a threat from the east,¹¹ it was only natural that Germany would assert a normal national self-confidence after unification.¹² Germany would again threaten other European powers with whom it had been allied during the Cold War.¹³ Others stressed that the new unified Germany would have to recognize its important responsibilities in

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- 9 Wittlinger and LaRose claim that the interpretation of German collective memory of the Holocaust and the Second World War underwent significant changes under the red-green governments between 1998 and 2005 with regard to the use of force, and this resulted in German collective memory losing its predictable use as a reason to oppose military action. See Ruth Wittlinger and Martin LaRose, »No Future for Germany's Past? Collective Memory and German Foreign Policy«, in: *German Politics* 16 (4) (2007), pp. 481-495.
- 10 Kenneth N. Waltz, »The Emerging Structure of International Politics«, in: *International Security* 18 (2) (1993), pp. 66-67. For an exploration of neorealism theory and its application to Germany in the post-Cold War environment, see Rainer Baumann, Volker Rittberger, and Wolfgang Wagner, »Neorealist Foreign Policy Theory«, in: Volker Rittberger (Ed.), *German Foreign Policy Since Unification: Theories and Case Studies*, Manchester 2001, pp. 37-67 and Evan Harrison, *The Post-Cold War International System: Strategies, Institutions, and Reflexivity*, London 2004, pp. 51-57.
- 11 Harrison, *The Post-Cold War International System*, (see note 10), p. 54.
- 12 Beverly Crawford, *Power and German Foreign Policy: Embedded Hegemony in Europe*, Basingstoke 2007, p. 13. According to Oppermann, this normalization of foreign policy has not meant an assertion of great power aspirations like realists predicted, but an increased salience for domestic considerations when formulating foreign policy. See Kai Oppermann, »National Role Conceptions, Domestic Constraints and the New ›Normalcy‹ in German Foreign Policy: The Eurozone Crisis, Libya and Beyond«, in: *German Politics* 21 (4) (2012), pp. 503-504. Similarly, Kundani criticizes the tendency to oversimplify Germany's foreign policy as returning to normality. See Hans Kundani, »The Concept of ›Normality‹ in German Foreign Policy Since Unification«, in: *German Politics and Society* 30 (2) (2012), pp. 38-58.
- 13 John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, New York 2014, p. 32. Also see Elizabeth Pond, *Beyond the Wall: Germany's Road to Unification*, Washington 1993, Ch. 12 and Philip Zelickow and Condoleeza Rice, *Germany Unified and Europe Transformed*, Cambridge 1995, Ch. 4.

the heart of Europe after the Cold War.¹⁴ Realists emphasize the inevitability of great power expansion, and surely a unified Germany dominated central Europe like no other state in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War.

While Germany inevitably was going to have more relative power after the Cold War, liberals and constructivists claim that this newly achieved power did not need to create a threat to peace and stability in central Europe. Liberal scholars have stressed the domestic basis of foreign policy formulation, and the end of the Cold War reduced systemic constraints and influences on German foreign policy. Thus, in recent years German foreign policy has been increasingly influenced by domestic political considerations.¹⁵ The German political culture stressing antimilitarism and multilateralism has resulted in Germany confounding realist expectations.¹⁶ Liberals contend that a political culture of restraint that had developed in West Germany in the decades prior to unification would powerfully shape the new unified German state's foreign policy.¹⁷ In addition, an increased sense of security would allow Germany to focus more on its economic interests, rather than being preoccupied with its physical security.¹⁸ This argument is based on an understanding of German foreign policy change in the wake of the Cold War as being incremental. Banchoff argues that to understand Germany foreign policy after unification, one must recognize a process of path dependence where Germany had become integrated with its neighbors and others in international institutions, and this integration had come to enjoy widespread domestic support.¹⁹ This was likely to continue

14 This argument can be found in Dirk Peters, »The Debate about a New German Foreign Policy after Unification«, in: Rittberger, *German Foreign Policy* (see note 10), pp. 16-19.

15 Oppermann, »National Role Conceptions« (see note 12), pp. 502-519.

16 John S. Duffield, »Political Culture and State Behavior: Why Germany Confounds Neorealism«, in: *International Organization* 53 (4) (1999), pp. 765-803.

17 For the best analysis of German foreign policy from a political culture perspective, see John S. Duffield, *World Power Forsaken: Political Culture, International Institutions, and German Security Policy after Unification*, Stanford 1998. Also see Jeffrey S. Lantis, »The Evolution of German Foreign Policy«, in: Ryan K. Beasley, Juliet Kaarbo, Jeffrey S. Lantis, and Michael T. Snarr (Eds.), *Foreign Policy in Comparative Perspective: Domestic and International Influences on State Behavior*, Washington 2002, pp. 70-94 and Thomas U. Berger, *Cultures of Antimilitarism*, Baltimore 1998, p. 203.

18 One could argue that the security provided by NATO and the bipolar stability of the Cold War allowed a new postmaterial culture to emerge in Germany and in many European states. For the emergence of this culture, see Ronald Inglehart, *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society*, Princeton 1990, pp. 66-103.

19 Thomas Banchoff, *The German Problem Transformed: Institutions, Politics, and Foreign Policy, 1945-1995*, Ann Arbor 1999, p. 2.

and heavily influence Germany's post-unification foreign policy.²⁰ Thus, the development and acceptance of an antimilitaristic approach to national security was likely to endure in the post-Cold War period.²¹ In addition, liberal institutionalists contended that the architecture of post-World War II international institutions would incorporate the unified Germany into a common Western alliance and economic system that would prevent any incentive for Germany to assert unilateral power.²² From the beginning of the process of unification, Germany's goal was to have unification of the state within an ever more integrated Europe.²³ It was Germany's readiness to share power within these European institutions that ironically encouraged others to trust Germany as a unified state in the aftermath of the Cold War.²⁴

For constructivists, Germany's liberal identity as a »civilian power« would keep it firmly within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU).²⁵ Moreover, Germany would want to continue to ben-

20 For how the principles of German post-war foreign policy would continue in a changing international environment after unification, see Andrew Denison, »German Foreign Policy and Transatlantic Relations since Unification«, in: *German Politics* 10 (1) (2001), pp. 155-176.

21 Berger, *Cultures of Antimilitarism* (see note 17), p. 167.

22 See G. John Ikenberry, »German Unification, Western Order, and the Post-Cold War Restructuring of the International System«, in: Peter C. Cadwell and Robert R. Shandley (Eds.), *German Unification: Expectations and Outcomes*, New York 2011, pp. 15-39; Franz-Josef Meiers, »A Change of Course? German Foreign Policy after Unification«, in: *German Politics* 11 (3) (2002), pp. 195-216; Gunther Hellmann, »The Sirens of Power and German Foreign Policy: Who is Listening?«, in: *German Politics* 6 (2) (1997), pp. 29-57. For the development and application of liberal or institutional IR theory to Germany after unification, see Corinna Freund and Volker Rittberger, »Utilitarian-liberal Foreign Policy Theory«, in: Rittberger, *German Foreign Policy Since Unification* (see note 10), pp. 68-104 and Harrison, *The Post-Cold War International System*, (see note 11), pp. 57-61. For an examination of the economic argument for Germany to remain close to the United States based on its economic interests, see Crawford, *Power and German Foreign Policy*, (see note 12), p. 188.

23 Kristina Spohr, »German Unification: Between Official History, Academic Scholarship, and Political Memoirs«, in: Steven Casey (Ed.), *The Cold War: Critical Concepts in Military, Strategic and Security Studies* (Volume IV – From Détente to the End of the Cold War), London 2013, p. 453.

24 Ash, *In Europe's Name* (see note 6), p. 358.

25 For the conceptualization of Germany as a »civilian power«, see Hanns W. Maull, »German Foreign Policy, Post Kosovo: Still a »Civilian Power?««, in: *German Politics* 9 (2) (2000), pp. 1-24. For constructivism and its applicability to German foreign policy after unification, see Henning Boekle, Volker Rittberger, and Wolfgang Wagner, »Constructivist Foreign Policy Theory,« in: Rittberger (Ed.), *German Foreign Policy Since Unification: Theories and Case Studies* (see note 10), pp. 105-137. Germany's participation in NATO in the first decade after the Cold War most closely conforms to the Constructivist paradigm. See Rainer Baumann, »German Security Policy within NATO«, in: Rittberger (Ed.),

efit from these Western institutions. Thus, it was in Germany's interest not to develop a more assertive foreign policy but continue to pursue its interests within these institutions.²⁶ Constructivists and liberals have both been proven correct in that Germany's foreign trade policy has emphasized liberalization of global trade²⁷ and continued support of the institutional framework of economic and military cooperation created in the aftermath of World War II. Germany's identity has increasingly become defined by its status as a major economic power, but one that does not seek to translate this economic power into an aggressive military posture. Constructivists predicted the identity Germany developed after World War II as an anti-militaristic state would persist even after international structural conditions permitted the possibility of Germany recalculating its interests and behaving like a traditional great power. How has Germany behaved since unification?

Liberals and constructivists for the most part were correct in assuming that Germany would operate within the institutions of NATO, the EU, and other international commitments that had previously brought security and prosperity to West Germany before unification.²⁸ Germany's leadership in these organizations since unification has strengthened these institutions and confirms the contention of liberals that the attractiveness of cooperation within the liberal world system is the best means of Germany to achieve its objectives. Indeed, Crawford contends that Germany has increasingly taken on the leadership

German Foreign Policy Since Unification: Theories and Case Studies (see note 10), pp. 141-184. Similarly, Wagner finds that Germany's behavior in the EU after the Cold War is best explained by constructivism. See Wolfgang Wagner, »German EU Constitutional Foreign Policy«, in: Rittberger (Ed.), *German Foreign Policy Since Unification: Theories and Case Studies* (see note 10), pp. 185-229. In a comprehensive assessment of German foreign policy in the first decade after the Cold War, Rittberger and Wagner find Constructivism best explains German foreign policy behavior. See Volker Rittberger and Wolfgang Wagner, »German Foreign Policy since Unification: Theories Meet Reality«, in: Rittberger (Ed.), *German Foreign Policy Since Unification* (see note 10), pp. 299-305.

26 See Dirk Peters, »The Debate about a New German Foreign Policy after Unification«, in: Rittberger (Ed.), *German Foreign Policy Since Unification* (see note 10), pp. 19-30.

27 See Corrina Freund, »German Foreign Trade Policy within the EU and GATT«, in: Rittberger (Ed.), *German Foreign Policy Since Unification: Theories and Case Studies* (see note 10), pp. 230-270.

28 This conclusion is shared by Volker Rittberger, »Introduction«, in: Rittberger (Ed.), *German Foreign Policy Since Unification: Theories and Case Studies* (see note 10) pp. 6-7. Behnke contends that the values that shaped West German foreign policy continued after unification in the post-Cold War German state, and Germany did not revert to what he calls the »geopolitik« or what I have identified as realism. See Andreas Behnke, »The Theme that Dare Not Speak its Name: Geopolitik, Geopolitics and German Foreign Policy Since Unification«, in: Stefano Guzzini (Ed.), *The Return of Geopolitics in Europe? Social Mechanisms and Foreign Policy Identity Crises*, Cambridge 2012, pp. 101-126.